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what caused japan to attack the united states

What happened prior to December 7, 1941 attack

A series of events led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. War between Nippon and the United States had been a possibility that each nation's military forces planned for in the 1920s. The expansion of American territories in the Pacific had been a threat to Nippon since the 1890s, though the real tension did not begin until the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931.

Japan's fear of being colonized and the government'due south expansionist policies led to its own Imperialism in Asia and Pacific in club to join the Great Powers, which only constituted of western nations. The Japanese government saw the need to be a colonial power to be mod, therefore, Western.[ane] [2] In addition, a series of racist laws fanned further resentment in Nihon. These laws enforced segregation and barring Japanese (and often Chinese) from citizenship, land buying and immigration.[2]

Over the next decade, Nippon expanded slowly into People's republic of china, leading to the 2d Sino-Japanese state of war in 1937. In 1940 Nihon invaded French Indochina in an effort to embargo all imports into Communist china, including war supplies purchased from the U.S. This motility prompted the United states of america to embargo all oil exports, leading the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to guess it had less than 2 years of bunker oil remaining and to support the existing plans to seize oil resources in the Dutch Due east Indies. Planning had been underway for some fourth dimension on an attack on the "Southern Resource Area" to add together information technology to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Nippon envisioned in the Pacific.

The Philippines, at that time an American protectorate, were also a Japanese target. The Japanese military concluded an invasion of the Philippines would provoke an American military response. Rather than seize and fortify the islands, and wait for the inevitable U.Due south. counterattack, Japan'southward armed forces leaders instead decided on the preventive Pearl Harbor attack, which they causeless would negate the American forces needed for the liberation and reconquest of the islands. (Later that same day [December eight, local time], the Japanese indeed launched their invasion of the Philippines).

Planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor had begun in very early on 1941, past Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. He finally won assent from the Naval Loftier Command by, among other things, threatening to resign. The attack was approved in the summer at an Imperial Conference and again at a 2d Conference in the autumn. Simultaneously over the year, pilots were trained, and ships prepared for its execution. Authorisation for the set on was granted at the 2nd Imperial Conference if a diplomatic result satisfactory to Japan was not reached. Afterward the Hull notation and final approval by Emperor Hirohito the lodge to set on was issued at the offset of Dec.

Background to conflict [edit]

Both the Japanese public and political perception of American animosity began in the 1890s. The American acquisition of Pacific colonies nigh Japan as well equally its brokering of the finish of the Russo-Japanese War via the Treaty of Portsmouth (which left neither belligerent, peculiarly Japan, satisfied) left a lasting general impression that the United States was inappropriately foisting itself into Asian regional politics and intent on limiting Nippon, setting the phase for later on more contentious politics between the 2 nations.[3]

Tensions between Japan and the prominent Western countries (the United States, French republic, United Kingdom and kingdom of the netherlands) increased significantly during the increasingly militaristic early reign of Emperor Hirohito. Japanese nationalists and military leaders increasingly influenced authorities policy, promoting a Greater E Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere as part of Japan'southward alleged "divine right" to unify Asia under Hirohito's rule.[a]

During the 1930s, Japan'due south increasingly expansionist policies brought it into renewed disharmonize with its neighbors, Russia and China (Japan had fought the Showtime Sino-Japanese State of war with China in 1894–95 and the Russo-Japanese War with Russian federation in 1904–05; Nippon's imperialist ambitions had a manus in precipitating both conflicts). In March 1933 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in response to international condemnation of its conquest of Manchuria and subsequent establishment of the Manchukuo boob regime there.[5] On January xv, 1936, Nippon withdrew from the Second London Naval Disarmament Conference considering the U.s. and the Uk refused to grant the Japanese Navy parity with theirs.[6] A 2d war between Nippon and Mainland china began with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937.

Japan's 1937 set on on Communist china was condemned past the U.South. and past several members of the League of Nations, including Britain, France, Commonwealth of australia and the Netherlands. Japanese atrocities during the conflict, such every bit the notorious Nanking Massacre that December, served to further complicate relations with the balance of the world. The U.S.,[b] U.k.,[c] French republic[d] and the Netherlands[due east] each possessed colonies in Eastward and Southeast Asia. Japan's new military ability and willingness to use it threatened these Western economic and territorial interests in Asia.

Beginning in 1938, the U.S. adopted a succession of increasingly restrictive trade restrictions with Japan. This included terminating its 1911 commercial treaty with Japan in 1939, further tightened by the Export Command Human activity of 1940. These efforts failed to deter Nippon from standing its war in China, or from signing the Tripartite Pact in 1940 with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italia, officially forming the Axis Powers.

Nihon would take advantage of Hitler's war in Europe to accelerate its ain ambitions in the Far East. The Tripartite Pact guaranteed assistance if a signatory was attacked by whatever country non already involved in conflict with the signatory; this implicitly meant the U.South. By joining the pact, Japan gained geopolitical power and sent the unmistakable message that any U.South. military intervention risked war on both of her shores[ commendation needed ]—with Frg and Italy in the Atlantic, and with Japan in the Pacific. The Roosevelt administration would not be dissuaded. Believing the American way of life would be endangered if Europe and the Far East savage under military dictatorship, [ citation needed ] it committed to help the British and Chinese through loans of coin and materiel, and pledged sufficient continuing aid to ensure their survival. Thus the United States slowly moved from beingness a neutral power to one preparing for war.[seven]

In mid-1940 Roosevelt moved the U.S. Pacific Fleet to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to deter Nihon.[eight] On Oct eight, 1940, Admiral James O. Richardson, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, provoked a confrontation with Roosevelt past repeating his earlier arguments to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark and Secretarial assistant of the Navy Frank Knox that Pearl Harbor was the incorrect place for his ships. Roosevelt believed relocating the fleet to Hawaii would exert a "restraining influence" on Nihon.[ commendation needed ]

Richardson asked the President if the Usa was going to war. Roosevelt's view was:

At least as early as October 8, 1940, ...affairs had reached such a state that the United states of america would become involved in a war with Japan. ... 'that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they fifty-fifty attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not e'er avoid making mistakes and that every bit the war continued and that area of operations expanded sooner or later they would brand a mistake and we would enter the state of war.' ... .[9] [ten]

Japan'southward 1940 motility into Vichy-controlled Indochina further raised tensions. Forth with Nippon'south war with People's republic of china, withdrawal from the League of Nations, alliance with Germany and Italy and increasing militarization, the movement induced the U.s. to intensify its measures to restrain Japan economically. The Us embargoed scrap-metal shipments to Japan and closed the Panama Canal to Japanese aircraft.[11] This hitting Japan's economy particularly hard considering 74.one% of Nippon's scrap iron came from the Usa in 1938. Likewise, 93% of Japan's copper in 1939 came from the United States.[12] In early 1941 Nippon moved into southern Indochina,[13] thereby threatening British Malaya, Due north Borneo and Brunei.

Japan and the U.South. engaged in negotiations during the form of 1941 in an effort to improve relations. During these negotiations, Japan considered withdrawal from well-nigh of Prc and Indochina after drawing up peace terms with the Chinese. Japan would also adopt an contained estimation of the Tripartite Pact, and would not discriminate in trade, provided all other countries reciprocated. Nevertheless General Tojo, and so Japanese War Minister, rejected compromises in Cathay.[14] Responding to Japanese occupation of key airfields in Indochina (July 24) following an agreement between Japan and Vichy France, the U.S. froze Japanese assets on July 26, 1941, and on August 1 established an embargo on oil and gasoline exports to Japan.[xv] [xvi] [17] The oil embargo was an especially strong response because oil was Nihon's almost crucial import, and more 80% of Nihon'south oil at the time came from the U.s.a..[eighteen]

Japanese war planners had long looked south, especially to Brunei for oil and Malaya for safe and can. In the autumn of 1940, Nihon requested 3.15 million barrels of oil from the Dutch Eastward Indies, only received a counteroffer of only ane.35 million.[19] The Navy was certain any try to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the state of war,[20] [ page needed ] just the complete U.Southward. oil embargo reduced Japanese options to two: seize Southeast Asia earlier its existing stocks of strategic materials were depleted, or submission to American demands.[21] Moreover, any southern operation would be vulnerable to set on from the Philippines, then a U.Southward. republic, so state of war with the U.South. seemed necessary in whatever case.[22]

After the embargoes and the asset freezes, the Japanese ambassador to Washington, Kichisaburō Nomura, and U.S. Secretarial assistant of State Cordell Hull held multiple meetings in club to resolve Japanese-American relations. No solution could be agreed upon for iii key reasons:

  1. Japan honored its alliance to Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact.
  2. Nippon wanted economic control and responsibility for southeast Asia (every bit envisioned in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere).
  3. Japan refused to leave mainland Mainland china (without its puppet land of Manchukuo[ clarification needed ]).[23]

In their final proposal on November 20, Nihon offered to withdraw its forces from southern Indochina and not to launch whatsoever attacks in southeast Asia provided the U.S., Uk, and holland ceased aiding China and lifted their sanctions against Japan.[14] The American counterproposal of November 26 (the Hull notation) required Nihon to evacuate all of People's republic of china, unconditionally, and to conclude non-aggression pacts with Pacific powers.

Breaking off negotiations [edit]

Part of the Japanese programme for the assault included breaking off negotiations with the U.s. 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese diplomatic mission in Washington, including the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburō Nomura and special representative Saburō Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.Due south. reactions to the Japanese move into French Indochina in the summer.

In the days before the attack, a long 14-role message was sent to the embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 null motorcar, in a naught named Royal by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1:00 pm Washington fourth dimension on December 7, 1941. The last part arrived late Sabbatum dark (Washington fourth dimension), but because of decryption and typing delays, equally well as Tokyo's failure to stress the crucial necessity of the timing, diplomatic mission personnel did non deliver the message to Secretary Hull until several hours after the attack.

The Us had decrypted the 14th role well earlier the Japanese managed to, and long before embassy staff composed a make clean typed copy. The final office, with its didactics for the time of delivery, had been decoded Saturday night but was non acted upon until the next morn (according to Henry Clausen[ citation needed ]).

Administrator Nomura asked for an date to see Hull at 1:00 pm, but later asked it exist postponed to one:45 equally the administrator was non quite ready. Nomura and Kurusu arrived at 2:05 pm and were received past Hull at 2:20. Nomura apologized for the delay in presenting the message. Subsequently Hull had read several pages, he asked Nomura whether the document was presented under instructions of the Japanese authorities; the Ambassador replied information technology was. Subsequently reading the full document, Hull turned to the ambassador and said:

I must say that in all my conversations with y'all...during the last nine months I have never uttered one discussion of untruth. This is borne out absolutely past the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more than crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions--infamous falsehoods and distortions on a calibration then huge that I never imagined until today that any Regime on this planet was capable of uttering them.[24]

Japanese records, admitted into testify during congressional hearings on the attack later the war, established that Japan had not even written a annunciation of war until hearing news of the successful attack. The two-line declaration was finally delivered to U.Southward. ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo about x hours after the completion of the set on. Grew was allowed to transmit information technology to the United States, where it was received tardily Monday afternoon (Washington time).

War [edit]

In July 1941, IJN headquarters informed Emperor Hirohito its reserve bunker oil would be exhausted within two years if a new source was not found. In Baronial 1941, Japanese prime minister Fumimaro Konoe proposed a summit with President Roosevelt to discuss differences. Roosevelt replied Japan must go out Communist china before a summit meeting could exist held.[ citation needed ] On September six, 1941, at the 2d Imperial Conference apropos attacks on the Western colonies in Asia and Hawaii, Japanese leaders met to consider the set on plans prepared past Imperial Full general Headquarters. The acme occurred one mean solar day after the emperor had reprimanded General Hajime Sugiyama, chief of the IJA General Staff, nearly the lack of success in China and the speculated depression chances of victory against the United States, the British Empire and their allies.[25]

Prime number Minister Konoe argued for more than negotiations and possible concessions to avoid war. However, military leaders such as Sugiyama, Government minister of War General Hideki Tōjō, and chief of the IJN Full general Staff Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano asserted time had run out and that additional negotiations would be pointless.[ citation needed ] They urged swift military deportment against all American and European colonies in Southeast Asia and Hawaii. Tōjō argued that yielding to the American demand to withdraw troops would wipe out all the gains of the Second Sino-Japanese State of war, depress Army morale, endanger Manchukuo and jeopardize command of Korea; hence, doing nix was the same as defeat and a loss of face.

On October 16, 1941, Konoe resigned and proposed Prince Naruhiko Higashikuni, who was also the choice of the army and navy, as his successor. Hirohito chose Hideki Tōjō instead, worried (every bit he told Konoe) about having the Royal House being held responsible for a war against Western powers.[26]

On November 3, 1941, Nagano presented a complete program for the attack on Pearl Harbor to Hirohito.[27] At the Imperial Conference on November five, Hirohito approved the programme for a war against the U.s.a., Uk and holland, scheduled to start at the first of December if an acceptable diplomatic settlement were not accomplished earlier so.[28] Over the following weeks, Tōjō'south war machine government offered a last bargain to the Us. They offered to leave only Indochina, but in render for large American economic aid.[ commendation needed ] On November 26, the so-chosen Hull Memorandum (or Hull Annotation) rejected the offer and demanded that, in add-on to leaving Indochina, the Japanese must leave Mainland china (without Manchoukuo) and agree to an Open Door Policy in the Far Due east.[29]

On November 30, 1941, Prince Takamatsu warned his brother, Hirohito, the navy felt the Empire could non fight more than two years against the United states of america and wished to avoid war. Afterward consulting with Kōichi Kido (who brash him to take his time until he was convinced) and Tōjō, the Emperor called Shigetarō Shimada and Nagano, who reassured him that war would be successful.[thirty] On December 1, Hirohito finally approved a "war against Usa, Nifty Great britain and The netherlands" during another Imperial Conference, to commence with a surprise set on on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at its main forrard base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.[28]

Intelligence gathering [edit]

On Feb iii, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, request him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add together 29-year-former Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially requested additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his pilus longer than military length, and causeless the cover name Tadashi Morimura.[31]

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking motorcar trips around the master islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing equally a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a loma. In one case, he gained admission to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to detect that Lord's day was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to exist in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that in that location was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor.[32] Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by directly delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.

In June 1941, German and Italian consulates were closed, and at that place were suggestions Nippon's should be closed, besides. They were not, considering they connected to provide valuable data (via MAGIC) and neither President Franklin D. Roosevelt nor Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted problem in the Pacific.[33] Had they been airtight, however, it is possible Naval General Staff, which had opposed the assault from the kickoff, would have called it off, since up-to-date information on the location of the Pacific Armada, on which Yamamoto's program depended, would no longer have been available.[34]

Planning [edit]

Expecting war, and seeing an opportunity in the frontward basing of the U.S. Pacific Armada in Hawaii, the Japanese began planning in early on 1941 for an attack on Pearl Harbor. For the next several months, planning and organizing a simultaneous attack on Pearl Harbor and invasion of British and Dutch colonies to the south occupied much of the Japanese Navy's time and attention. The plans for the Pearl Harbor attack arose out of the Japanese expectation the U.S. would exist inevitably fatigued into war subsequently a Japanese set on against Malaya and Singapore.[35]

The intent of a preventive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval ability in the Pacific, thus removing it from influencing operations against American, British, and Dutch colonies. Successful attacks on colonies were judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. Planning[f] had long predictable a battle in Japanese habitation waters after the U.S. fleet traveled across the Pacific, nether attack by submarines and other forces all the style. The U.Due south. fleet would be defeated in a "decisive battle", equally Russia'due south Baltic Fleet had been in 1905. A surprise attack posed a twofold difficulty compared to longstanding expectations. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not exist easy to defeat or to surprise. 2nd, Pearl Harbor'due south shallow waters fabricated using conventional aerial torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii'southward altitude meant a successful surprise attack could non be blocked or speedily countered by forces from the continental U.Southward.

Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by the British action in the Boxing of Taranto, in which 21 obsolete Fairey Swordfish disabled one-half the Regia Marina (Italian Navy). Admiral Yamamoto even dispatched a delegation to Italy, which concluded a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time necessary to establish a "barrier" defence force to protect Japanese command of the Dutch Eastward Indies. The delegation returned to Nihon with information about the shallow-running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.[ citation needed ]

Japanese strategists were undoubtedly influenced by Admiral Togo's surprise attack on the Russian Pacific Armada at Port Arthur in 1904. Yamamoto's emphasis on destroying the American battleships was in keeping with the Mahanian doctrine shared by all major navies during this menstruum, including the U.S. Navy and Purple Navy.[37]

In a letter dated Jan 7, 1941, Yamamoto finally delivered a rough outline of his plan to Koshiro Oikawa, and so Navy Minister, from whom he also requested to be made Commander in Chief of the air armada to attack Pearl Harbor. A few weeks later, in yet some other letter, Yamamoto requested Admiral Takijiro Onishi, main of staff of the Eleventh Air Fleet, study the technical feasibility of an set on against the American base of operations. Onishi gathered every bit many facts as possible about Pearl Harbor.

After first consulting with Kosei Maeda, an expert on aeriform torpedo warfare, and being told the harbor's shallow waters rendered such an attack almost impossible, Onishi summoned Commander Minoru Genda. Subsequently studying the original proposal put forth by Yamamoto, Genda agreed: "[T]he plan is hard but non incommunicable".[38] Yamamoto gave the majority of the planning to Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, who was very worried about the area'south air defenses. Yamamoto encouraged Kusaka past telling him, "Pearl Harbor is my idea and I need your support."[39] Genda emphasized the assault should be carried out early in the morning and in total secrecy, employing an shipping carrier force and several types of bombing.[38]

Although attacking the U.Southward. Pacific Fleet anchor would achieve surprise, it also carried two distinct disadvantages. The targeted ships would be sunk or damaged in very shallow water, meaning it would be quite likely that they could exist salvaged and possibly returned to duty (as 6 of the eight battleships eventually were). Too, most of the crews would survive the attack, since many would be on shore go out or would be rescued from the harbor afterward. Despite these concerns, Yamamoto and Genda pressed ahead.

By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known equally Functioning Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō at Tsushima.[ citation needed ] Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest near Kagoshima City on Kyūshū. Genda chose it because its geography and infrastructure presented virtually of the same problems bombers would confront at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew flew over the 5,000 ft (ane,500 thousand) mountain behind Kagoshima and pigeon into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to 25 ft (7.6 m) at the piers. Bombardiers released torpedoes at a breakwater some 300 yd (270 thou) abroad.[40]

However, even this depression-altitude approach would not overcome the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japanese weapons engineers created and tested modifications assuasive successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo, which inflicted near of the ship damage during the eventual attack.[ citation needed ] Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by plumbing fixtures fins and release shackles to 14- and xvi-inch (356- and 406-mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the lightly armored decks of the sometime battleships.

Concept of a Japanese invasion of Hawaii [edit]

At several stages during 1941, Japan's military machine leaders discussed the possibility of launching an invasion to seize the Hawaiian Islands; this would provide Japan with a strategic base to shield its new empire, deny the The states whatever bases beyond the Due west Declension and further isolate Australia and New Zealand.

Genda, who saw Hawaii equally vital for American operations against Nippon after war began, believed Japan must follow whatsoever attack on Pearl Harbor with an invasion of Hawaii or risk losing the war. He viewed Hawaii as a base to threaten the west declension of North America, and peradventure as a negotiating tool for ending the war. He believed, following a successful air attack, 10,000-fifteen,000 men could capture Hawaii, and saw the operation every bit a precursor or alternative to a Japanese invasion of the Philippines. In September 1941, Commander Yasuji Watanabe of the Combined Fleet staff estimated two divisions (thirty,000 men) and 80 ships, in addition to the carrier strike force, could capture the islands. He identified two possible landing sites, about Haleiwa and Kaneohe Bay, and proposed both be used in an operation that would require upward to iv weeks with Japanese air superiority.[41]

Although this thought gained some support, it was soon dismissed for several reasons:

  • Nippon's footing forces, logistics, and resource were already fully committed, not only to the Second Sino-Japanese War but also for offensives in Southeast Asia that were planned to occur almost simultaneously with the Pearl Harbor attack.
  • The Purple Japanese Ground forces (IJA) insisted information technology needed to focus on operations in China and Southeast Asia, and refused to provide substantial back up elsewhere. Because of a lack of cooperation between the services, the IJN never discussed the Hawaiian invasion proposal with the IJA.[41] [chiliad]
  • Nearly of the senior officers of the Combined Fleet, in particular Admiral Nagano, believed an invasion of Hawaii was too risky.[h] [41]

With an invasion ruled out, it was agreed a massive carrier-based iii moving ridge airstrike confronting Pearl Harbor to destroy the Pacific Fleet would be sufficient. Japanese planners knew that Hawaii, with its strategic location in the Central Pacific, would serve as a critical base from which the United States could extend its military ability against Japan. Yet, the confidence of Japan's leaders that the conflict would be over chop-chop and that the United States would cull to negotiate a compromise, rather than fight a long, bloody war, overrode this business organization.[i] [42] [43] [44]

Watanabe'south superior, Captain Kameto Kuroshima, who believed the invasion plan unrealistic, later on the war chosen his rejection of it the "biggest mistake" of his life.[41]

Strike force [edit]

On November 26, 1941, the day the Hull notation (which the Japanese leaders saw as an unproductive and old proposal) was received, the carrier force nether the control of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (already assembled in Hitokappu Wan) sortied for Hawaii nether strict radio silence.

In 1941, Japan was ane of the few countries capable of carrier aviation.[45] The Kido Butai, the Combined Armada'due south main carrier strength of six aircraft carriers (at the time, the most powerful carrier forcefulness with the greatest concentration of air power in the history of naval warfare),[46] embarked 359 airplanes,[j] organized as the First Air Fleet. The carriers Akagi (flag), Kaga, Sōryū, Hiryū, and the newest, Shōkaku and Zuikaku, had 135 Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Centrolineal codename "Zeke", commonly called "Goose egg"), 171 Nakajima B5N Blazon 97 torpedo bombers (Centrolineal codename "Kate"), and 108 Aichi D3A Blazon 99 swoop bombers (Allied codename "Val") aboard. Two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, nine destroyers, and three fleet submarines provided escort and screening. In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines, which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack. It likewise had viii oilers for underway fueling.[47]

Execute society [edit]

On Dec one, 1941, after the striking force was en route, Master of Staff Nagano gave a verbal directive to the commander of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, informing him:

Japan has decided to open hostilities against the U.s., Great britain, and holland early on in December...Should information technology appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations volition accomplish an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to exist assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.[48] [The Kido Butai will] proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, volition launch a resolute surprise attack on and bargain a fatal accident to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Surface area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, 10 Day.[48]

Upon completion, the force was to render to Nihon, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Stage Operations".

Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 past Nagano, instructed Yamamoto to shell hostile naval and air forces in Asia, the Pacific and Hawaii, promptly seize the chief U.S., British, and Dutch bases in Eastern asia and "capture and secure the fundamental areas of the southern regions".[48]

On the habitation leg, the force was ordered to be alert for tracking and counterattacks past the Americans, and to render to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands, rather than the Habitation Islands.[49]

Lack of preparation [edit]

In 1924, General William 50. Mitchell produced a 324-page written report warning that future wars (including with Nihon) would include a new office for aircraft against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, simply his warnings were ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl Harbor in a written analysis shortly subsequently taking office. American commanders had been warned that tests had demonstrated shallow-h2o aerial torpedo attacks were possible, simply no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated this. In a 1932 fleet problem, a surprise airstrike led by Admiral Harry E. Yarnell had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage, a finding corroborated in a 1938 exercise by Admiral Ernest King.[50] In October 1941, Lord Louis Mountbatten visited Pearl Harbor. While lecturing American naval officers on Royal Navy tactics against the Germans, an officeholder asked when and how the United States would enter the war. Mountbatten pointed to Pearl Harbor on a map of the Pacific and said "right here", citing Japan's surprise assail on Port Arthur, and the British assault on Taranto. In Washington he warned Stark almost how unprepared the base was against a bomber assault; Stark replied, "I'one thousand afraid that putting some of your recommendations into upshot is going to brand your visit out there very expensive for the U.Southward. Navy".[51]

By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Part of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-One thousand, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval zippo traffic, though nothing actually conveying meaning data about Japanese military plans in 1940–41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, some of which tin can exist accounted for by lack of resource and manpower.[52] [ page needed ] At all-time, the information bachelor to decision makers in Washington was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was thus, incompletely understood. Zero in it pointed direct to an attack at Pearl Harbor,[g] and a lack of sensation of Royal Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was not a possible assault target. Only i message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December.[53] While the Japanese Diplomatic codes (Majestic code) could be read, the current version (JN-25C) of the Japanese Naval code (JN-25) which had replaced JN-25B on iv December 1941 could not be read until May 1942.

U.South. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, proficient information suggesting additional Japanese assailment throughout the summer and fall before the assault. At the time, no reports specifically indicated an assault confronting Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned[54] war with Japan was expected in the very well-nigh future, and it was preferred Japan brand the first hostile deed.[55] It was felt war would nearly probably starting time with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines,[56] Indochina, Thailand, or the Russian Far Eastward; Pearl Harbor was never mentioned equally a potential target. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting simply that war with Nihon was expected in the well-nigh future and all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active warning status in Hawaii, the assault might have been resisted more than effectively, and possibly resulted in less death and impairment. On the other hand, recall of men on shore exit to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (every bit the set on alarm status would have required),[50] or killed (in their obsolete aircraft) by more experienced Japanese aviators. When the attack really arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, almost armament locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.grand., no torpedo nets in the harbor), combat air patrol non flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at starting time light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks (non ready to fly at a moment'south warning), and so on.

Still, because it was believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged to inconvenience ordinary operations. As a upshot of express numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as oftentimes or as far out equally required for acceptable coverage against possible surprise assail (they improved considerably, with far fewer remaining planes,[ citation needed ] afterwards the set on). The Navy had 33 PBYs in the islands, but but three on patrol at the time of the assault.[58] Hawaii was depression on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming bachelor for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be fabricated available to the Pacific (where they were intended as a deterrent). The British, who had contracted for them, even agreed to accept fewer to facilitate this buildup. At the fourth dimension of the attack, Army and Navy were both on grooming condition rather than operational warning.[ commendation needed ]

There was also defoliation virtually the Ground forces's readiness status as General Short had changed local alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Virtually of the Army'due south mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with armament locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on individual holding)[ citation needed ]. Additionally, shipping were parked on airfields to lessen the risk of sabotage, non in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short'due south interpretation of the war warnings.

Chester Nimitz said afterward, "It was God's mercy that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor on December vii, 1941." Nimitz believed if Kimmel had discovered the Japanese arroyo, he would have sortied to come across them. With the three American shipping carriers (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga) absent and Kimmel'south battleships at a astringent disadvantage to the Japanese carriers, the likely effect would have been the sinking of the American battleships at sea in deep water, where they would have been lost forever with tremendous casualties (as many every bit twenty thousand dead), instead of in Pearl Harbor, where the crews could easily be rescued, and half-dozen battleships ultimately raised.[59]

See also [edit]

  • Pearl Harbor accelerate-knowledge conspiracy theory

Notes [edit]

  1. ^ The effort to constitute the Purple Way (kōdō) had begun with the 2nd Sino-Japanese War (called seisen, or "holy state of war", by Nippon).[4]
  2. ^ Possessing the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island
  3. ^ With Hong Kong, Burma, Singapore and the territory of the future Malaysia
  4. ^ With French Indochina (in WWII), including Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
  5. ^ With Republic of indonesia, the erstwhile Dutch East Indies
  6. ^ Both U.South. and Japanese, every bit it turns out.[36]
  7. ^ It was for these reasons IJA also rejected proposals for an invasion of Australia.
  8. ^ For a more than detailed analysis of whether a Japanese invasion of Hawaii could have been successful, see "Invasion: Pearl Harbor!". Combinedfleet.com.
  9. ^ In late April or early May of 1942, Yamamoto reportedly secured a tentative agreement that an invasion of Hawaii would exist launched after military operations in the Western Pacific were completed and additional footing troops and warships were available. By mid-1942, Yamamoto had assembled sufficient forces for an invasion of the Midway Atoll, which was expected to serve as a base for further attacks against Hawaii. However, in the subsequent Battle of Midway, the loss of iv of Japan's half dozen largest aircraft carriers fabricated any hereafter air and naval operations (let lonely an invasion) against Hawaii incommunicable.
  10. ^ The figure of 414 includes scout planes operated by escorts, which were non function of the strike force.
  11. ^ In Baronial 1941 Yugoslav/English amanuensis Dušan Popov submitted a report to the F.B.I. J. Edgar Hoover including a questionnaire about Pearl Harbor from the Japanese.
  12. ^ Technically called "Condition Zed".[57]

References [edit]

  1. ^ Kublin, Hyman (October 1959). "The Development of Japanese Colonialism". Comparative Studies in Society and History. 2 (i): 67–84. doi:10.1017/S0010417500000554. JSTOR 177547 – via Cambridge University Printing.
  2. ^ a b Burress, Charles (July xix, 2001). "Biased history helps feed U.Southward. fascination with Pearl Harbor". The Japan Times . Retrieved January 31, 2021.
  3. ^ Toland 1970.
  4. ^ Bix, Herbert (2001). Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. pp. 326–327.
  5. ^ "Imperial Rescript to Withdraw from League of Nations". Retrieved October 24, 2009.
  6. ^ Lester H. Brune and Richard Dean Burns, Chronological History of U.Due south. Strange Relations: 1932-1988, 2003, p. 504.
  7. ^ Parkes, Henry Bamford. Recent America, A History Of The The states Since 1900 (Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1946)Page. 635-645
  8. ^ Shift Of Our Fleet To Atlantic Studied, New York Times, June 23, 1940
  9. ^ Joint Congressional Hearings on the Pearl Harbor Set on, Role 40, ^p.506, "Conclusions Restated With Supporting Evidence".
  10. ^ Richardson, "On the Treadmill", pp.425 and 434; Baker, "Human Fume", p.239, ISBN 1-4165-6784-iv
  11. ^ Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, translated by Wen Ha-hsiung. History of The Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), 2nd ed. (Taipei, Republic of Cathay: Chung Wu Publishing, 1971), p.317, "Invasion of French Indochina".
  12. ^ Barnhart, Michael A. (1987). Nihon Prepares for Full State of war: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941 . Ithaca: Cornell UP. pp. 144–145. ISBN9780801419157.
  13. ^ Bix 2001, p. 395.
  14. ^ a b Chapter V: The Conclusion for State of war Morton, Louis. Strategy and Command: The First Two Years
  15. ^ Editors. "United States freezes Japanese assets". HISTORY. History Channel. Retrieved December 12, 2018.
  16. ^ Bix 2001, p. 401.
  17. ^ Worth, Roland H., Jr., No Choice But War: the United States Embargo Confronting Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Jefferson, Due north Carolina: McFarland, 1995). ISBN 0-7864-0141-9
  18. ^ Yuichi Arima (December 2003). "The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.Due south. vs Japan". ICE Case Studies (118). Archived from the original on October 13, 2007. Retrieved April 10, 2006.
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  20. ^ Peattie, Mark R. & Evans, David C. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
  21. ^ Tape, Jeffrey (February 2009). "Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Indelible Lessons". Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army State of war College. Retrieved July 26, 2016.
  22. ^ Evans & Peattie 2012, p. 489.
  23. ^ La Feber, Walter. Polenberg, Richard The American Century, A History Of The United states Since the 1890s (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), pp. 243-247.
  24. ^ Memorandum 95 Regarding a Conversation, Between the Secretary of Land, the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and Mr. Kurusu Peace and State of war: Us Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)
  25. ^ Bix 2001, pp. 411 & 745.
  26. ^ Wetzler, Peter (1998). Hirohito and War. p. 44.
  27. ^ Wetzler 1998, pp. 29 & 35.
  28. ^ a b Wetzler 1998, p. 39.
  29. ^ OUTLINE OF PROPOSED Footing FOR Agreement Between THE UNITED STATES AND Japan Peace and State of war: United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 (Department of State, Washington, DC 1943)
  30. ^ Bix 2001, pp. 430–431.
  31. ^ Toland, John (1970). The Rising Lord's day: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945. Random House. pp. 152–53.
  32. ^ Toland 1970, p. 167.
  33. ^ Prange, Gordon Due west.; Dillon, Katherine 5.; Goldstein, Donald M (1991). At Dawn We Slept. New York: Penguin. p. 151.
  34. ^ Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991, pp. 151–152.
  35. ^ Evans, David C.; Peattie, Marking R. (2012). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941. Seaforth Publishing. pp. 462. 489. ISBN978-ane-84832-159-v.
  36. ^ Miller, Edward S. (2007). War Program Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, Md: United states of america Naval Plant Press. ISBN978-1-59114-500-four.
  37. ^ Willmott, Barrier; Miller, State of war Programme Orange.; Peattie & Evans, Kaigun; Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power on History.
  38. ^ a b Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991, pp. 25–27.
  39. ^ Lord, Walter (2012). 24-hour interval of Infamy. Open Road Media. p. xiv. ISBN978-1453238424.
  40. ^ Toland 1970, p. 160.
  41. ^ a b c d Caravaggio, Angelo N. (Wintertime 2014). ""Winning" the Pacific State of war". Naval War College Review. 67 (1): 85–118. Archived from the original on July 14, 2014.
  42. ^ Goldstein, Donald Thousand. (1993). The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans . Washington: Brassey's. ISBN9780028810010.
  43. ^ Weinberg, Gerhard L., A World at Artillery: A Global History of Earth War II. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), pp. 260, 323, and 329-330.
  44. ^ Willmott, H.P. The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Centrolineal Strategies, Feb to June 1942. (United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983)[ page needed ]
  45. ^ Evans, David C. (1997). Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Japanese Regal Navy, 1887-1941. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute. p. 472.
  46. ^ United states Department of the Navy clarification of Pearl Harbor Attack
  47. ^ Lodge of Battle for Pearl Harbor Set on
  48. ^ a b c United states Army. Japanese monograph #97. Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, 5 Nov to two Dec 1941. Washington, D.C.: US dept of the Army.
  49. ^ Japanese Monograph No. 97
  50. ^ Rebekah. "The Day that Will Alive in Infamy…just it didn't have to". The USS Flier Project. Retrieved Baronial vii, 2012.
  51. ^ O'Toole, Thomas (December 7, 1982). "Mountbatten Predicted Pearl Harbor". Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved November 5, 2020.
  52. ^ Kahn, David. The Codebreakers; Prange et al., Peaarl Harbor: The Verdict of History.
  53. ^ Costello, John (1994). Days of Infamy: MacArthur, Roosevelt, Churchill – the Shocking Truth Revealed. New York: Pocket Books. p. 174. ISBN978-0-671-76985-7.
  54. ^ November 28, 1941, message
  55. ^ ibiblio.org
  56. ^ War alarm, dated 27 November 1941
  57. ^ Prange, Dillon & Goldstein 1991.
  58. ^ Naval Air Station, Kanoehe Bay, during the Pearl Harbor Raid Archived 2012-01-07 at the Wayback Machine
  59. ^ Prange, Gordon W.; Goldstein, Donald M; Dillon, Katherine V. (1982). Miracle at Midway . McGraw-Hill. p. ix. ISBN978-0-07-050672-v.

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